

## Seeing Is Believing Thence Knowing: Some Linguistic Insights Into The Interrelation Between Knowledge And Visual Perception

### Key words :

Knowledge

*How sensory data form cognition has been subject to extensive discussion from the past. The etymological meanings of the terms that denote 'to see/ look at' and 'to perceive' have been corresponding and complementary in most of the Indo-European languages including Sanskrit. Although some such terms were semantically restricted over time some others retained the breadth of meaning their Proto Indo-European roots had carried. The somatic activity of seeing/ looking at something and the cognitive activity of perceiving it share a series of terms where those denotative of 'visual perception' seem to be predominant. This paper concisely compares selected Proto Indo-European roots and their derivatives in Indo-Germanic, Indo-Iranian and Indo-Aryan languages to recognize some interesting matches and mismatches in terms of phonetic composition and meaning. It also argues that in the context of Indian philosophy the terms that denote to see and to perceive are more strikingly corresponding than they do in other environments.*

\*\*\*\*\*

**Dr. Rohana Seneviratne**

University of Peradeniya

Peradeniya, Sri Lanka

E-mail: rohana.seneviratne@gmail.com

## Seeing Is Believing Thence Knowing: Some Linguistic Insights Into The Interrelation Between Knowledge And Visual Perception

Perception constitutes a significant dimension of epistemology while the nature of perception based on sensory data has been debated for centuries in the east and the west alike. It is self-evident that visual sensory data are gathered when one sees or looks at physical objects with his naked eyes, upon which cognitive activity such data are then decoded and interpreted. This paper attempts to compare and examine concisely the etymological multivalence of a few terms in Indo-European languages, with special attention to those in Indian philosophical contexts, which are known to denote 'knowledge' and 'visual perception' to recognize some interesting matches and mismatches in terms of phonetic composition and meaning. It also argues that the terms that denote 'to see' and 'to know' are more strikingly corresponding in the context of Indian philosophy in particular than they do in other environments. It is thus expected to shed some significant light on epistemological research on visual data as the foremost set of sensory data that form knowledge.

It is observed that words that denote 'to see' also mean 'to know' in most of the languages from the Indo-European language family, whereas in few other languages it is not so. However, this observation implies that the means of knowledge, at least for speakers of the languages which seem to treat 'seeing' and 'knowing' as corresponding activities, more strongly rely upon 'ocular source' rather than the other sources of sensory perception. Examining the etymological history of several pertinent words may help us understand this fact better.

The words derived from Proto Indo-European (PIE) root \*weid- (to see) appear in some Indo-Germanic languages in different forms. The English words such as 'wise' (<Old English *wīs*, wise), 'wisdom' (<Old English *wīsdōm* - wisdom/ learning), 'wiseacre' (<Old High German *wīzagviz*. knowledgeable) have derived from the suffixed form (\*weid-to-) of the aforementioned

PIE root whereas 'wit' (including all of its derivatives such as witty and witness) descended from its zero-grade form (\*wid-). This PIE root in its form \*weid-e, with the participle form \*weid-to, has given birth to a number of English words, the current usage of which is more semantically connected with the somatic act of 'seeing' or 'sight' rather than cognition, i.e., the mental process of 'knowing'.

The English words exercised alone and in compounds such as 'vision, vide, view, visage, visor, visit, vista, voyeur, and clairvoyant' and those found to be lemma in prefixed and suffixed words such as 'ad-vice, de-vice (things seen down), im-pro-vice (not-before-seen > not seen ahead), re-vice (to see anew), di-vide (two-seen), e-vid-ent (seen out clearly)' derived from the Latin root *vidēre*. The significance of this Latin root which is both transitive and intransitive in verb paradigms obviously lies, within the parameters of the present discussion, in the fact that it etymologically connotes both 'to see/look at with the (physical) eyes' and 'to see/look at with other organs of sense /the mind/the mind's eye, viz. 'to notice, perceive, discern or understand'. Among the above English derivatives, the words such as 'vision', 'view' and, though originally from French, 'clairvoyant' also carry, in contemporary usage in particular, both the strata of the meaning that their Latin root is known to impart. In the Greek, Slavic, and Bohemian counterparts of the PIE root under discussion each stem has two distinct forms with obviously separate meanings: *εἰδέναι* (*eidenai* - to know) / *ἰδεῖν* (*idein* - to see), *věděti* (to know) / *viděti* (to see) and *vjedjeti* (to know) / *vidjeti* (to see) respectively. However, the Sanskrit stem  $\sqrt{\text{vid}}$ , which is widely accepted to have derived from the PIE root \*wid-(the zero-grade form of \*weid-) does not impart the meaning 'to see (with the physical eyes)' in any literary context, presumably including Vedic texts, though the root  $\sqrt{\text{vid}}$  often means 'to know, notice, perceive, learn, and

understand'. Similarly, the Pali equivalent of this root is also devoid of the meaning 'to see' but is found often employed in the sense 'to know, to sense, or to experience'. All Sanskrit and Pali word formations from the root  $\sqrt{\text{vid}}$  are thus related only to 'knowing' and 'knowledge', which are not somatic in functional terms; viz. devoid of the 'physical act of seeing with the eyes'. The root  $\sqrt{\text{vid}}$  stands for the meaning identical to that in classical Sanskrit, 'to know', in old Bactrian language preserved in Avestan scriptures as well. Given this exception it can generally be assumed that the primary meaning of the PIE root \*weid- in Indo-Iranian and Indo-Aryan languages has not been as extensive as that in Indo-Germanic languages.

The usage of the English word 'wit' derived from the Proto-German and Old English stem \*witjan/witan (to know) was first recorded to mean 'one's ability to make clever remarks in an amusing way' in 1542 and to denote its nomen agentis, 'one who is clever or intellectual', in about 1470. Although the English word 'wit' alone, in its current usage, does not possess any implication like 'to see with the physical eyes', the verb and noun 'witness' in contemporary English is obviously connected with one's ocular activity. Therefore, it is obvious that 'to witness' is still understood and accepted, interestingly enough even in non-philosophical contexts, to be the most 'reliable' means of knowledge acquisition. Nevertheless, in modern German, the word formations from the infinitive 'wissen' also remain to mean only 'to know', which is understandably 'mental' in terms of the locus of activity.

It is then unequivocal to us that the PIE root \*weid- has generated verbal stems to mean almost only 'to know' in most of the Indo-Aryan / Iranian Languages and those to mean both 'to know' and 'to see (with the physical eyes)' in many Indo-Germanic languages. With such an initial conjecture it would then be worth inspecting a few Sanskrit verbal stems which etymologically mean 'to see' so that the interrelation between ocular

activity and cognition can be analysed in light of epistemology. The verbal stems most commonly and oftenest observed both in the Vedic language and Sanskrit to mean 'to see' or 'to look at' are  $\sqrt{\text{drś}}$ ,  $\sqrt{\text{spāś}}$ ,  $\sqrt{\text{lok}}$  and  $\sqrt{\text{īkṣ}}$ . of these stems,  $\sqrt{\text{drś}}$  which is declined as  $\sqrt{\text{paśin}}$  several tenses and moods should be highlighted since it forms the noun 'darśana' known, in general, to signify 'philosophy' or 'profound thinking'. In its current usage, darśana seems to be best translated as 'vision' in English but it is manifest that, etymologically, 'darśana' (in Sanskrit) and 'vision' (in English) derive from two mutually different verbal stems both in phonetic and semantic terms. To elaborate, the PIE root of  $\sqrt{\text{drś}}$  is deemed to be \*derk- (full-grade) which appears as \*dṛk-on(t)- in its suffixed zero-grade form. The root 'δερκεσθαι (derkesthai)' in Greek which etymologically means 'to see clearly' forms the morpheme 'δρακ' (drak) while its Latin equivalent remains to be 'dracō' from which 'dragon' in current English derives. As is observed in the Avesta, the Old Bactrian stem 'darəs' (to look) is also a derivative of the PIE root \*derk-. The Sanskrit noun 'darśana' is heavily loaded with both meanings, i.e., 'seeing' and 'knowing/perception', though it would be quite puzzling not to see any prominent English equivalent with identical meaning derived from this very root. The stem variant  $\sqrt{\text{spāś}}$  (to see/ to perceive) is better understood when mapped onto its PIE root, \*spek- (to observe). This PIE root appears in Latin as specere (to look at) and in Greek as σκεπτεσθαι (skeptesthai – to examine/ consider) in a similar manner it does in Sanskrit. A considerably large number of English words in use such as 'spy', 'espy' (<Old French espier = to watch), 'specimen', 'aspects', 'inspect', 'perspicuous', 'respect', and 'speculate' stem from this PIE root via its Latin form, specere. Many of such words, along with their affixes, carry either of the meanings, 'seeing' or 'knowing-through-seeing', viz. perception, while the Sanskrit words derived from  $\sqrt{\text{spāś}}$  also denote both the ocular activity alone as well as the mental activity

through the ocular activity. The Sanskrit roots √lok and √ikṣ whose PIE cognates are considered to be associated with those of √ruc and √ás respectively are found in both Vedic language and classical Sanskrit primarily not only to mean 'to see (with the physical eyes)' but also in the sense 'to know'. The English verb 'to look' (<Old English lōcian < West Germanic lokōn) in the sense 'to perceive' corresponds to the Sanskrit equivalent √lok although from the PIE root \*ekw- (to see/eye) derives the English word 'ocular' (<Latin oculus, Greek ὄσσε, οκταλλοσ) as is found in the Platonic 'ocularcentric paradigm' and many other philosophical discourses. The root \*ekw- is well preserved, though in different grade forms, in most of the sub-families of the Indo-European language including Old High German 'ouga' (> German Auge), Old Saxon 'ōga' (> Dutch oog), Old Norse 'auga' (> Swedish öga), Old English 'ēage' (> English 'eye'), and more strikingly, Russian 'oko', and Lithuanian 'aki-s'. Most of the words in daughter languages derived from the PIE root \*ekw- are found employed in diverse contexts to mean, interestingly, both 'seeing (with the physical eyes)' and 'knowing'.

With such deliberations we may now look into why direct experiential knowledge (pratyakṣain Sanskrit, paccakkha in Pali) in which visual perception seems to be the foremost, takes priority over the other sources of perception as a means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). Almost all Indian philosophical streams including Buddhism have in common accepted more accommodatingly the credibility or authoritativeness of (visual) perception over the other means of knowledge. Manu, author of the most acclaimed Sanskrit Dharmaśāstra work titled Manusmṛti, states, though rather implicitly, that even in the Vedic epistemology pratyakṣais considered the most authoritative in worldly matters. Further, in the Naiyāyikas' construal of the epistemology of perception is found pratyakṣato be the most credible out of the four means of knowledge while Sāṃkhya,

Vaiśeṣika and Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsā philosophers admit pratyakṣain preference together anumāna (logical inference) or śabda (verbal testimony) or both. Notably, it is the Cārvākas who accept nothing else but only pratyakṣas as the means of valid knowledge. Dinnāga, Vasubandhu, Śāntarākṣita, Dharmakīrti, Nāgārjuna and such other major Buddhist philosophers have refuted Jainas' and many Hindu philosophers' lines of reasoning by elaborately interpreting, with extensive arguments, direct visual perception as the most authoritative.

While elucidating the philosophical dimensions of visual perception Buddhist philosophy logically rebuts nine invalid sources of knowledge including even scriptural tradition (piṭakasampadā) and (divine) revelation (anussava) upon which many other Indian schools of philosophy are inclined to rely substantially. Buddhism thus offers an opportunity to approach and thereby know its philosophy empirically (ehi-passiko) and in person (paccattaṃ veditaṃ) and also advocates twofold perceptions for enlightenment: sensory (indriyapratyakṣa) and extrasensory (atīndriyapratyakṣa). It should therefore be manifest that pratyakṣa has been considered to be the most authoritative and credible over the other means of knowledge in almost all Indian religio-philosophical contexts across ages. Moreover, since the term pratyakṣa (prati-akṣa), which literally means '(present) before the eye(s)', is exercised in a much broader sense to include not just the (physical) eyes but also all the sensory organs one possesses, 'seeing with the physical eyes' predominates over the other sensory activities in perception. It would also be interesting to note here that the Pali term 'paccakkha' (<paṭi-akkha) is found in the early Buddhist texts in the sense 'personal', substantiating the fact that 'to see an object with one's own eyes' is interpreted as 'to experience it personally'. Similarly observed, vipassanā (lit. insight) taken to be the most effective introspective meditation in Buddhism is often introduced as 'paccakkha-gñāna' (knowledge by

direct perception). The Sanskrit word 'sākṣa' (sa-akṣa), which is recurrently found in its ablative form 'sākṣāt' and which forms other related words like 'sākṣi', 'sākṣya' and 'sākṣin' also has retained its ascribed meaning more related to the cognitive activity rather than to 'seeing' physically. In order to narrow down the sensory perception to the 'physical act of seeing', the collocation 'direct perception' has been preferred by many English writers whose usage of the adjective 'direct' indicates their understanding of the absence of any obstruction between the perceiver and the perceived.

Further, one who in the flesh 'sees' an object with his physical eyes is eligible to be considered as one who gains direct/ personal knowledge of the very object. This thesis would be clearer if even a few honorific epithets to the Buddha as in Pali scriptures are examined. Of such terms, the most frequently found are 'sabba-dassāvī' (all-seer), 'samantacakkhu' (all-eyed) and 'sabbaññū' (all-knower, i.e., one who is omniscient). These epithets except the last involve the act of 'seeing' and the 'eyes' whether or not used metaphorically. It is also observed in the Buddhist philosophical texts of the Theravada tradition that the terms known to denote 'knowledge' (gñāna) and 'seeing' (dassana) are collocates as well as compounds (as in gñānadassana).

In conclusion, 'seeing (with the physical eyes)' and 'perception (and thereby wisdom)' can be postulated as two corresponding and complementary activities in terms of the terms that denote them in most of the Indo-European languages. Furthermore, some terms that were etymologically broader and richer in meaning seem to have lost their polysemy and remained less denotative compared to their PIE roots. A linguistic approach to such terms would thus provide us with a broader understanding of the history and the interrelation of the concept words in the epistemology of perception.

### Abbreviations

A	:	Āṅguttara Nikāya
DA	:	Dīghanikāya Aṭṭhakathā
DhsA	:	Dhammasaṅgaṇī Aṭṭhakathā
J	:	Jātaka
M	:	Majjhima Nikāya
MS	:	Manusmṛti
P	:	Pāṇinīya (Aṣṭādhyāyī)
PM	:	Paṭisambhidāmagga
PV	:	Pramāṇavārtika
PvA	:	Petavatthu Aṭṭhakathā
SN	:	Saṃyutta Nikāya
Sdhp	:	Saddhammopāyana
SS	:	Sphoṭasiddhi
V	:	Vinayaṭṭhaka
VM	:	Visuddhimagga

### Works Cited:

- Barnhart, Robert K. (ed.). 1988. The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology. New York: H.H. Wilson.
- Davids, T. W. Rhys. 1998. The Pali Text Society's Pali- English Dictionary. Oxford: The Pali Text Society. First published in 1921-1925.
- Edgerton, Franklin. 1941. 'samprasāraṇa, Emergence; Emergent (Vowel)'. Journal of the American Oriental Society. Vol. 61. No. 4. 222-223.
- Joseph H. (ed.). Avestan Dictionary Online. <http://www.avesta.org/kanga/english.htm>. Accessed on 14/04/2008.
- Lee, H. D. P. (tr.). 1974. Plato: The Republic. London: Penguin.
- Onions, C.T. (ed.). 1966. The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology. Oxford: OUP.
- Pokorny, Julius. 1969. Proto-Indo-European Etymological Dictionary (Indogermanisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch). Paris: French & European Publications.
- Riddle, J.E. (ed.). 1836. A Complete Latin-English Dictionary. London: Longman.
- Shipley, Joseph T. 1945. Dictionary of Word

Origins. New York: The Philosophical Library.  
Sibley, F.N. 1967. Seeking, Scrutinizing, and Seeing in 'The Philosophy of Perception' ed. G. J. Warnock (Oxford Readings in Philosophy Series). Oxford: OUP. 127-149.  
Skeat, Walter W. 1911. A Concise Etymological Dictionary of the English Language. Oxford: OUP.  
Skeat, Walter W. 1970. The Science of Etymology. Maryland: McGrath.  
Soltis, Jonas F. 1966. Seeing, Knowing and Believing, London: George Allen and Unwin.  
Smith, William (ed.) 1870. Latin-English Dictionary Based upon the Works of Forcellini and Freund. London: John Murray.  
Watkins, Calvert (ed.) 2000. The American Heritage Dictionary of Indo-European Roots. 2nd Edition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.  
Wedgwood, Hensleigh. 1859. A Dictionary of English Etymology. Vol III, part 2. London: Trübner.  
Williams, Monier Monier (ed.) 1899. A Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

#### REFERENCE :

- 'To see' and 'to look at' are not identical in terms of the meaning which reveals the doer's physical activity since the former activity is undeliberate, whereas the latter is deliberate. This therefore raises a series of philosophical problems. Sibley: 127-149.
- Watkins: 96-97.
- Skeat (1911): 613 suggests that the PIE root of 'divide' be \*widh- (to separate), which seems to be more accurate. The Sanskrit equivalent is √vidh which the words such as vidhavā (widow) are derived from. Skeat further suspects the root \*uidere of being its PIE stem which he calls 'a lost verb'. Cf. diuidere in Latin (to divide, to separate).
- ShIPLEY: 188.
- Skeat (1911): 613 provides that the Latin root uidere means 'to see' and videre 'to know'. The shift between the consonant 'v' and the vowel 'u' is the phonetic law known as samprasāraṇa in Sanskrit and is seen in Germanic word formations too as explained by the Grimm's Law of sound shifting. [The accurate English translation of the term 'samprasāraṇa' is rather debated. See Edgerton: 222-223].
- Riddle: 719 (columns 1-2).
- Smith: 1193 (columns 1-3).
- Barnhart: 1207, 'vision = sense of a mental concept'.
- Monier Williams cites 'to observe' as one of the meanings of the root √vidas is found in the Vedas but does not provide any due reference. Williams: 963.
- Dauids: 625, 647, 648.
- frā ashava vidhvā mraotū (Avesta Yasna 1.3) [vidhvā = vidvān (Skt.)]  
vidush mazdā ahurahyā (Avesta Yasna 28.4) [vidush = viduḥ (Skt.)]  
vaēdā tat yā ahmi mazdā (Avesta Yasna 46.2) [vaēdā = veda (Skt.)].
- Cf. The Gothic words unvits /unweis (= unwise) and unfaurveis (= unforeseen), also the Welsh word gwydd (=knowledge, presence) convey both meanings, i.e. sight and knowledge.
- Barnhart: 1207, Cf. 'wit' [or 'wiz < wizard', as in pc-wiz, web-wiz] in English and '-vid' in Sanskrit (as in śāstra-vid, brahma-vid) as agent nouns.  
P 7.3.78.
- Watkins: 16, Pokorny: 213.
- darāsātā= 'visible, beautiful to see' (Avesta Yasna 4.37).
- Cf. Gothic tarhjan and Sanskrit darśana.
- Watkins: 82. Pokorny suggests \*spek.
- The metathesized form of \*spek is \*skep-. It is thus more likely that the English words such as 'sceptic' are more philologically derived from their Greek equivalents rather than from the Latin roots which undergo no metathesis.
- Cf. Skt. spaśa which means 'spy'.
- The Avestan equivalent (spasyeiti) is closer to the Sanskrit root in terms of its phonological composition than to the Pali root. See Davids: 447.  
In the Rgveda, spāśayate (causative, active present) is found in the sense 'to make clear, to show, to perceive and to observe'. The corresponding roots in the Germanic languages do not, in general, drop the preceding syllable's-' of the root but often undergo metathesis.
- P 1.3.63.
- Monier Williams (3, 170) doubts that the roots √vikṣ and √vaś are interconnected though the latter from which the word akṣi is derived is in the Uṇādisūtra-s.
- "The world of knowledge ... [which] when seen is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally either in public or private life must have his eye fixed". Plato's Republic: VII 517 [my italics].
- According to Jainism, the term 'pratyakṣa', however, does not mean the perception through the empirical/ physical act which involves the eyes but consists of avadhijñāna (visual knowledge), manoparyāyajñāna (intuition of mental knowledge) and kevalajñāna (pure and perfect knowledge). Jainism defines akṣi not as the 'eye' but the 'soul'.
- Maṇḍanamīśra states that 'the revelation (of an object) clearly or vaguely is confined to direct perception. In the case of the other means of knowledge, there is either apprehension (of the object) or not at all'. SS.23 (S. Iyer's translation, my italics).
- pratyakṣenānumityā vā yastūpāyo na budhyate - etadvidanti vedena tasmādvedasya vedatā [The Veda is called 'veda' (knowledge) because by means of the Veda are learnt the means which cannot be known by direct perception or inference], MS: 7.
- Dharmakīrti ironically argues that to merely possess a sharp (physical) vision may not be entertained as facilitating valid knowledge, in the sense the knowledge that helps us liberate ourselves, and thence is not a pramā (true cognition). Otherwise even vultures should be honoured. PV. 2.35.
- A. 3:65 (Kālāma Sutta).

(Continued on Page No. 48)

know that there are others also who have suffered for the country's freedom and are worse off. She tells the husband to mortgage the house and to feed the children and take a pledge not to break the Congress seal and sell foreign cloth. She says, "मैं मुहर तोड़ने को कभी न कहूँगी। डाक्टर तो कुछ अमृत पिला न देगा।...मैं जी ही कर क्या उपकार कर दूँगी। देश को स्वराज्य मिले, लोग सुखी हों, बला से मैं मर जाऊँगी। हजारों आदमी जेल जा रहे हैं, कितने घर तबाह हो गए, तो क्या सबसे ज्यादा प्यारी मेरी जान है?"<sup>17</sup>

She further adds, "मेरी दवा दारू कि चिंता न करो। ईश्वर कि जो इच्छा होगी, वो ही होगा। बाल बच्चे भूखे मरते हैं मरने दो। देश में करोड़ों आदमी ऐसे हैं जिनकी दशा हमारी दशा से भी खराब है। हम न रहेंगे, देश तो सुखी रहेगा"<sup>18</sup>

The story shows a time when even a bedridden lady refuses treatment of her ailment at the cost of the Swarajya for the country. Though she is not actively participating in the movement but she is no less than a warrior.

Another story Gulli-Danda shows author's immense love for each and everything that belongs to his country. The very special feature of this story is its strong message of 'Swadeshi', in a very easy and simple way. Munshiji expresses his great fondness for the native games, especially Gulli-Danda, which he thinks is better than any other foreign games and urges countrymen to opt for it, "विलायिती खेलों में सबसे बड़ा ऐब है कि उनके सामान महंगे होते हैं। जब तक कम से कम एक सैकड़ा ना खर्च कीजिये, खिलाड़ियों में शुमार नहीं हो पाता। यहाँ गुल्ली डंडा है जो बिना हिंग फिटकरी के चोखा रंग देता है; पर हम अंग्रेजी चीजों के पीछे ऐसे दीवाने हो रहे हैं कि अपनी सभी चीजों से अरुचि हो गयी है। स्कूलों में एक लडुके से तीन-चार रुपये सालाना केवल खेलने कि फीस ली जाती है, किसी को ये नहीं सूझता कि भारतीय खेल खिलाएं जो बिना दाम कौड़ी के खेले जाते हैं। अंग्रेजी खेल उनके लिए हैं जिनके पास धन है।"<sup>19</sup>

Munshi Premchand's literary works brought out that how during that period; patriotism had become a religion and an integral part of the day to day life of the people. After going

through his stories one comes to know that the loyalty towards nation knew no boundaries of age, gender, class or community. People from all walks of life and of all ages had put their heart and soul for the noble cause of emancipation of the motherland. The simplicity and clarity in the language makes his literary works so lucid and absorbing that while reading them the emanation of a strong sense of zeal and attachment for the country is inevitable. Scenes are so lively depicted that a reader actually ends up going through the same emotions which the characters undergo. Premchand's contribution towards the national movement through his writings was enormous and certainly must have inspired many to join the movement, during the critical phase of freedom struggle.



**(Continued from Page No. 16) Seeing is Believing .....**

30. Note here that 'passiko', lit. 'see' (<passa, imperative mood) stands for the imperative 'know' or 'understand'. Cf. SN 4.3.1.
31. Cf. paccakkha (clear, evident, perceptible to the sense: DhA 254, PvA 125, Sdhp 416), paccakkhato (from personal experience: J 5.45; 1.252; 3.168), paccakkhena (personally: J 1.377), and appaccakkhāya (without seeing or direct perception VM 532). Davids: 383.
32. M. 2. 127 "yo sabbaññū sabbadassāvī aparisesamñānadassanaṃ paṭijānissati". Cf. A. 4. 428-429, M. 1. 111.
33. Noteworthy is that the English agent noun 'seer' (lit. one who sees, Sanskrit darśavāt, Pali dassāvin) is known to denote 'prophet' or 'one having clairvoyance' (and thereby 'wiser' than others). In Celtic \*wid-, it is seen preserved in the sense 'seer' as observed in the compound nouns such as \*dru-wid.
34. PM. 1.131-132.
35. 'Omni-scient', the English rendering of the Pali term concerned here, contains the lemma '-scient' (< Latin scire - to know) derived from the PIE root \*skei- (to cut off, to discern), from which the Sanskrit equivalent √chid too descends, but which is not related to the act of 'seeing'. Nevertheless, the German equivalent of English 'omniscient' is 'all-wissend' and consists of the German derivative of the PIE \*weid-. Cf. Pokorny: 919-922.
36. Cf. DA 1.22, PM. 2.244, V. 2.178; Cullaniiddesa 235: "yāvatakaṃ gñeyyaṃ tāvatakaṃ gñānaṃ", V 3.91: "yaṃ gñānaṃ taṃ dassanaṃ yaṃ dassanaṃ taṃ gñānaṃ". "All things visible are knowable as well as our knowledge is based on empirical grounds". Davids: 287-288.



17. Taavaan , Maansarovar, Bhaag: 1(2010), Delhi, Medha Books, p.248.  
18. Ibid, pp.252-253.  
19. Gulli-Danda , Maansarovar, Bhaag: 1(2010), Delhi, Medha Books, p.143.