

India and China:  
Interactions  
Between the Two  
Major Emerging  
Asian Powers

Anand Pratap Singh

Department of  
Political Science  
Baba Saheb  
Bhimrao Ambedkar  
University, Lucknow

[www.shodh.net](http://www.shodh.net)

# India and China: Interactions Between the Two Major Emerging Asian Powers

*Key words:- Sino-India Relation, Indo-China Relation*

*This paper focuses on the evolution of the relationship between India and China in the Asian region. Drawing on the theoretical tradition of regionalism and deepening this framework considering the impacts of interdependency, hegemonic. Stability theory and equilibrium theory on it, the paper presents a model through which the dyadic evolution of the relationship and its possible influence on East Asia might be interpreted.*

It is still unpredictable whether China's and India's paths will lead them to interacting as rivals or partners. They are the two most populated countries in the world, they are both experiencing an exponential economic growth and they are both expanding and strengthening their national interests within and outside the Asian region.

This paper focuses on the evolution of the relationship between China and India in Asia. Starting from the importance of the positions both countries have acquired within the region, it explores how one of these two countries could play a leading role in it. It is suggested that both paradigms might be useful for interpreting how India and China relationship will develop within the Asian scenario. Through the analysis of the history of the two countries since the end of the Second World War, the paper deepens the background and interests of cooperation and the underlying causes for the rivalry between India and China.

This comparative analysis is extended to the contemporary period, so as to understand how the most recent events have impacted on the two countries bilateral and regional relations. Further, the impact of two limiting actors -Pakistan and the United States - is considered. This paper concludes by asserting that despite conflicting interests and competitive interactions frameworks currently characterize the region, a collaborative scenario in which both India and China play a leading but concerted role is more likely to happen.

### **Interdependence or Hegemony**

The end of the Cold War downfall the Soviet Union was correlated to the progressive emergence of new countries that succeeded in transforming the global equilibrium in a multipolar system even if they were unable to act as counterweight to the United States as the Soviet Union was able to do in a bipolar world.

Asia can be considered as a typical example of multipolarity, as several countries competing for power and influence can be identified within the region. On the one hand, there is the United States, the

India and China:  
Interactions  
Between the Two  
Major Emerging  
Asian Powers

Anand Pratap Singh

Department of  
Political Science  
Baba Saheb  
Bhimrao Ambedkar  
University, Lucknow

[www.shodh.net](http://www.shodh.net)

supposed hegemonic power of the world, which is not in the region but has significant interests and a steady presence there. On the other hand, there is China, apparently the most important country in Asia. India, an emerging power whose influence might become more and more significant for Asia in general and for China in particular; and Pakistan, a country linked in a variety of ways to all the aforementioned States.

Such a situation can be interpreted in different ways according to the theories of interdependence on the one hand and the paradigm of hegemonic stability on the other. Considering the Asian scenario, it is evident that power is unequally distributed among countries. Therefore, it might be consistent to assume that free trade in the area will not be able to set up a context of harmony of interests where every country can improve its own wealth and contribute at the same time to the collective wealth.

In order to address these criticisms, As it is difficult to coordinate all these distinct interactions, relations among different issue areas have to be led through institutions and regimes. Within them, countries can opt for coordinating their behaviors as cooperation becomes necessary. Indeed, thanks to institutions and regimes there are rules and regulations accepted and abided by every country as they are sure that the same rules are acknowledge and kept by everybody.

According to the interdependence theorists, the relatively recent development of several international institutions in Asia, such as APEC, ASEAN, SAARC and ARF, can be interpreted as a consciousness raising from Asian countries of the benefits they can experience deciding to coordinate their behaviors with the help of a suprastate body. Within these institution Asian and non-Asian countries are currently demonstrating that it is possible to achieve agreements and compromises on several issues and, as a consequence, deepen integration and interrelation among them in a peaceful and consensus based way.

Gilpin argued that the international system can be in balance only when no state considers convenient changing it . Usually, the balance is guaranteed by the strongest country. However, the costs for maintaining the status quo can be very high, and sometimes they can become even higher than what the strongest country can effectively stand. In such a condition, if the equilibrium is not immediately and effectively restored, a hegemonic war can occur, ending in a new balance. Gilpin identified a set of three factors that can foreshadow a potential hegemonic war: a differential growth of power between countries, environmental variables, and divergent internal variables. Any change in the balance of these factors can disturb or even smash the existing order; therefore a hegemonic war can break up ending with a new hegemon assuming the control of the new status quo.

Once again, neoliberals rebut to this foreshadow with their institutionalist approach. In "After Hegemony" (1984) Robert Keohane theorizes how countries can cooperate without a hegemon . Unlike liberals, Keohane does not speak about harmony but about cooperation. From his point of view, the stabilizing role has to be played by institutions or regimes. Making another step forward from the assumptions of the theory of interdependence, Keohane underlines that countries have both common and contrasting interests. Institutions and regimes, instead, are able to create and spread information, and information can

India and China:  
Interactions  
Between the Two  
Major Emerging  
Asian Powers

Anand Pratap Singh

Department of  
Political Science  
Baba Saheb  
Bhimrao Ambedkar  
University, Lucknow

[www.shodh.net](http://www.shodh.net)

help single countries in structuring more reliable expectations on other countries' choices, interests and behaviors. Furthermore, institutions are able to create rules and decrease transaction costs. Within this pattern, cooperation can succeed as on the one hand it can be based on interests that are tangible and recognizable by partners, while on the other hand collective bargaining within the institution is usually convenient for each player.

Trying to fit this model to the Asian region, cooperation can be considered appropriate and profitable for every country as it might create a win-win situation. Indeed, Keohane recognizes that usually at the beginning regimes reflect power distribution among states, but afterwards cooperation patterns can be interiorized and as a consequence work properly even without a hegemon. At the same time, Keohane acknowledges that states are "rational egoists": rational because they always consider the costs and benefits balance before taking any decision, and egoists as even when pushed to cooperate they decide whether they want to collaborate or not according to their national interests. On the contrary, the hegemonic stability paradigm can depict an unbalanced scenario where India and China might build up a competitive relationship oriented at strongly and deeply influencing the region as a whole. The following analysis is intended to show which one can be the more likely framework in which Asian countries are going to interact.

#### Historical Relations

India and China are two of the world's oldest continuous civilizations. In premodern times there were much closer ties between them. Buddhism, for example, entered China from India, while India was one of the key stopover points on Ming Admiral Zheng He's voyages. They have both also had a significant influence in the surrounding regions, especially Central Asia and Southeast Asia. More recently, both have undergone similar experiences in the 18th and 19th centuries relating to the influence of Western colonial powers and colonial trading regimes.

In the post World War II period, India was among the first countries that chose to recognize the People's Republic of China, with which India established diplomatic relations on 1 April, 1950. After recognition both countries started exchanging high-level visits, as Premier Zhou Enlai went to India in June 1954 and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru visited China in October of the same year.

Both countries were early supporters of the Non-Aligned Movement of developing states. In 1955 China attended the important Bandung conference at the invitation of India. Indeed, China's Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence grew out of not only domestic policy making but also the processes and ideas surrounding Bandung. During this early period, the Sino-Indian relationship was frequently summarized by the expression "China-India Bhai Bhai" (China and India are brothers), reflecting the depth of their shared cultural and intellectual history.

Nevertheless, India and China also shared a longstanding rivalry tradition. As far as their bilateral relations are concerned, from the late 50s to the 1970s, China-India relations were very strained. These problems stemmed from two new developments in the bilateral

relationships: Chinese "liberation" of Tibet, and the border dispute. In addition, the improved ties between China and Pakistan and the increased influence of the US between India and China also provided cause for discontent.

Since the time of the British Empire, the Tibetan plateau had provided a vital buffer zone between India and China. However, in 1950 China decided to "liberate" Tibet. This de facto takeover has never been accepted by the Tibetans. China considered the annexation of Tibet as the final stage in its unification. When Tibetans started demonstrating and demanding the end of Chinese rule, Chinese troops were sent to stop the revolt and thousands of protesters were killed. In 1959, fearing arrest by the Chinese authorities, the Dalai Lama fled to India where he was offered asylum. This asylum continues to be a cause of tension between India and China.

The "liberation of Tibet" also worsened the border dispute, as the removal of Tibet as a buffer zone made India and China direct neighbours. The main disputed border areas were and remain the Askai Chin plateau in the West and the so-called McMahon Line in the East, the line drawn by the British in 1914.

In the West, India disputed China's occupation of the Askai Chin Plateau, which was critical to China's control of Tibet. In the East, China challenged the legitimacy of the McMahon Line because the Chinese government never accepted the authenticity of the British deal.

China adopted the position that its boundary with India had never been formally delineated, therefore it called for negotiation and compromise on the basis of traditional customary lines. India, however, argued that the boundary was well defined on both "natural-historical" (in the West) and juridical grounds (in the East), and it refused further negotiations for the border. This disagreement over the border led to a short war in 1962, when India suffered a humiliating defeat. In 1964, only two years after the conflict, China became a nuclear power, condition that alarmed India and further fuelled the distrust between the two countries. The different relations during the Cold War were further exacerbated by Sino-Soviet antagonism and ongoing Indo-Pakistani confrontations.

#### **Contemporary Bilateral Relations**

At the end of the Cold War the geopolitical scenario changed completely. India and China have been able to rethink their bilateral relationship. From 1988 to 1998 there was a noticeable improvement in China-India relations. In December 1988, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China. This was the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister in 34 years. Even the negotiations over the border dispute seemed to start a new era of slowly but potential peaceful confrontation and improvement.

However, May 1998 signed a new setback, as India declared her willingness to conduct five nuclear tests, the Pokhran II tests. In a letter to the then US President Clinton, Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee explicitly linked the nuclear tests to a perceived nuclear threat from China. China considered this declaration as a betrayal of the spirit underpinning the recent improvements in relations between the two countries. Nevertheless, while China formally protested, it decided not to take any real countermeasure against India and surprisingly bilateral

relations were quickly brought back on track in 1999 to the purpose of confidence building . This approach might be also linked to the position the US assumed in the region. While Indo-U.S. relations were strained throughout the Cold War, when New Delhi was a key member of the non-aligned movement, around 1998 an emerging India-US relationship was clearly recognizable, leading the Chinese leadership to consider potentially dangerous to further stretch tensions with India.

Actually, this dynamic is still important, as the better the India-US relationship is, the stronger India-China relationship China wants to build, and current events like Hu Jintao's visit to India keep on confirming it. In line with the restored habit of exchanging high-level visits, Prime Minister Vajpayee visited China in June 2003. This visit was very important for the Chinese leadership as Vajpayee had been the Prime Minister who decided in the 90s "to go nuclear", and who announced the Chinese threat as a justification of his decision.

This visit can be outlined as a success for several reasons. First, negotiations on the border dispute were speeded up. Second, in this occasion India officially recognised China's sovereignty over Tibet. Third, both countries expressed their willingness of starting a military cooperation and by November 2003 defence cooperation had already been enhanced, as joined naval exercises were staged.

This high-level visits process made another breakthrough in April 2005, when the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited India. During this visit, the Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity was signed, whose statement affirmed that India and China were entering a new stage of development. Such a partnership was intended to be based on the principles of Panchsheel (peaceful coexistence), mutual respect and sensitivity for each other's concerns and aspirations, and equality a sound framework for an all around and comprehensive development of bilateral relations based on mutual and equal security, development and prosperity of the two peoples and to jointly addressing global challenges and threats.

Both parties also showed a willingness to settle the border dispute. In appreciation of Indian recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, China officially recognised the one of India over Sikkim. Since May 1975, when India abolished the monarchy, Sikkim (a region nestled in the Himalayas, on the Eastern border) officially became the 22nd state of the Indian Union. As the Chinese also claimed their sovereignty over the state, they never recognized Sikkim as being a part of India . The deal recognition of the sovereignty issue over Tibet and Sikkim can be interpreted as intending to show the willingness of both parties to improve and enhance trust and cooperation between themselves.

The strength of the political relationship between the two countries is still developing, as the November 2006 visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao in India clearly demonstrates . This is simply the most senior in a series of visits and exchanges that have been organized in 2006, designated as the year of Chinese-Indian Friendship. Improvements in China-India relations have been possible thanks to their strengthened economic development and bilateral trade ties. They are two strong economic powers: China growth rate was 9.5 in 2004, 9.9% in 2005, and 11.1 in 2006, while the Indian one was, respectively,

India and China:  
Interactions  
Between the Two  
Major Emerging  
Asian Powers

Anand Pratap Singh

Department of  
Political Science  
Baba Saheb  
Bhimrao Ambedkar  
University, Lucknow

[www.shodh.net](http://www.shodh.net)

6%, 8%, and 7%. Moreover, if we consider that these two countries have developed a robust two-way trade in recent years, whose growth rate averaged 32% per year and whose amount was, as of 2006, US\$25 billion, their economic power becomes even more apparent.

For India the necessity of enhancing the bilateral trading relationship appears crucial. China is now India's second largest trade partner and some experts have predicted that China could even overtake the US as India's first trade partner in the near future<sup>23</sup>. Bilateral trade is expanding very fast, from US\$200 million in 1991, to US\$2 billion in 1999, to US\$18 billion in 2005, and US\$ 25 billion in 2006<sup>24</sup>. Further, during Hu Jintao's visit India and China agreed to raise the annual volume of their bilateral trade to US\$40 billion by 2010 .

Moreover, Sino-Indian commercial relationship cannot be considered a balanced one. Indeed, while half of the exports from India to China consist of primary products, Chinese exports to India are much more diverse with high value-added products predominant. Consequently, from a commercial point of view, it seems that India is much more dependent on China. Further, "China has a literacy rate of 95%, compared to India's 68%. India's bilateral exports of manufactured goods in the financial year ending March 2006 were \$71 billion, compared to \$713 billion for China" . Despite that, during Hu Jintao's November 2006 visit India, showed a strong commitment in helping Indian development. Of the 13 accords signed during the visit most are designed to allow for high level cooperation in key areas of India's commercial and technological development, such as the Agreement for Promotion and Protection of Investments, that provides a framework for bilateral investment flows between the two countries the Agreement on Cooperation in Inspection of Iron Ore, the protocol for streamlining rice export from India, and the partnership in Science and Technology. In addition, as most of trade between India and China has taken place via sea routes, both countries have stressed the necessity of building new land routes between them in order to enhance transport and trade networks.

With this evolution in mind it might appear evident that India and China are experiencing and consolidating a trend of mutual trust and respect and a high level and broadening cooperation. Nevertheless, a deeper and multilevel analysis might reveal that the consideration of the usefulness and the importance of a wider and deeper economic integration describe only one side of the coin. On the other side, an enduring, not to say growing, competition between the two giants to affirm their presence (from an economic, political and military point of view) in the crucial Asia-Pacific theatre and in the developing world is clearly recognizable.

**Role of India and China in Asia**

In considering the role of India and China in Asia it is important to note that they are both among the most influential states and have a range of overlapping and divergent interests in Southeast Asia, Central and West Asia. If China and India have similar economic and trade concerns, their strategic view of the region is different.

Both India and China are trying to expand their links to West Asia, largely driven by those regions energy suppliers. Both countries are heavily reliant on imported oil from the Persian Gulf through

India and China:  
Interactions  
Between the Two  
Major Emerging  
Asian Powers

Anand Pratap Singh

Department of  
Political Science  
Baba Saheb  
Bhimrao Ambedkar  
University, Lucknow

[www.shodh.net](http://www.shodh.net)

the Indian Ocean. India is signing agreements with the Persian Gulf states, while China is developing oil holdings in Iran . From a strategic perspective, the war on terror and the Iraqi conflict have further complicated the scenario. China is more concerned than India over a potential permanent US presence in the region. Further, as India has a more balanced relationship with the United States than China, the links between the US and Pakistan on the war on terror might appear as hindrances to Chinese efforts to expand its influence within this area.

Finally, India has always seen itself as the pre-eminent power in the South Asia subregion, and it is unwilling to acknowledge that China might also have an interest in South Asia and in the Indian Ocean, while China is actually strengthening more and more its presence in this part of the region. China is watchful of India's growing profile in Central and East Asia, even if officially both countries welcomed Beijing's association with the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as an observer.

American interest in deepening purely strategic perspective, its ties with India has been interpreted as a way for creating a counterweight to China in Asia. Indeed, even after the normalization of their bilateral relations, China and the United States still have reasons for reciprocal concern. In the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations of 1979, the US for the first time officially recognized the People's Republic of China and that Taiwan is a part of China. Moreover, during the following three years the two countries signed several economic, cultural, scientific and technological bilateral agreements.

Sino-US relations have been strained by the Tiananmen protest in June 1989, after which the United States suspended the high-level official exchanges and it imposed the economic sanction that broke the trade relationship. During President Clinton administration, both countries get once again closer, and while Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited the US in 1997, President Clinton flew to China in 1998. Despite criticism, in this period the two countries have been able to sign new agreements on trade and nuclear issues.

During the late 90's the relationship between the two countries slowed down once again further to the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the air crash of April 2001. However, China and the United States got back on track immediately after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. While China offered a strong public support to the war on terrorism, the United States moved their primary security threat from the People's Republic of China to the Middle East.

At the same time, whether China was seen as a potential strategic ally for containing the terrorist threat, its exponential economic growth accompanied by a significant increase in commercial imbalances between the two countries placed emphasis on the hypothesis of containing China creating a counterweight to its power in Asia. India is the only country that can play this role, and this is one of the main reasons why the United States opts for strengthening their links with India.

However, this strategy creates concern for Beijing. Indeed, during Hu Jintao's visit to India, the Chinese Presidents proposed the Indian's one to promote cooperation in the field of nuclear energy as "expansion of civilian nuclear energy programme is an essential and

India and China:  
Interactions  
Between the Two  
Major Emerging  
Asian Powers

Anand Pratap Singh

Department of  
Political Science  
Baba Saheb  
Bhimrao Ambedkar  
University, Lucknow

[www.shodh.net](http://www.shodh.net)

important component of their national energy plans to ensure energy security. As two countries with advanced scientific capabilities, they stress the importance of further deepening cooperation bilaterally as well as through multilateral project such as ITER, and enhance exchanges in the related academic fields". Strengthening not only nuclear collaboration but also cooperation in several fields like, among others, trade, industry, finance, agriculture, and infrastructure, Beijing seems trying to both prevent the United States transforming India in a counterweight to China within the Asian region and exploring the potential for a constructive relationship with New Delhi.

### Conclusion

India and China as countries struggling for gaining more influence in Asia, the roles other countries in and outside the region (like Pakistan and the United States) are playing cannot be neglected. Indeed, it seems that in the complicated and interrelated Asian framework, the costs of competition appear too high for every player. Therefore, every country might find more opportunities to pursue interaction and to reconcile conflicting interests in a transparent and widely recognized structure such as the one provided by international or regional institutions.

From the proceeding analysis, a growing trend of engagement between India and China can be identified. These countries are trying to find an understanding over their contentious border; they have strengthened diplomatic, economic and strategic interactions; and they seem more and more interested in developing a peaceful neighboring relationship in order to promote a fast economic development. Moreover, the recent spread of international organizations within the region further highlight the interest of Asian countries in emphasizing the idea of consensus based cooperation.

However, even though India and China seem guided by a realistic approach coming from both foreign policies interests and domestic issues, and even though some scholars have predicted that this situation might lead the two countries towards a more supportive approach among themselves, it is also evident that the basis of India and China cooperation is still delicate. Indeed, as Somini Sengupta affirmed during President Hu Jintao's visit to India, "as India and China tend their flourishing economies and strive to expand their global reach, they also increasingly find themselves scrambling for natural resources and political influence around the world" . At the same time, it has been widely recognized that China-India relationship cannot be considered a relation of equals. Except for the size of the software industry, India lags behind on most developmental indicators.

Further, some geopolitical factors that may impair China-India relations can be easily recognized. Among them, the long-lasting relationship between Pakistan and China and the sense of competition between India and China as rising powers. From this point of view, it seems that China does not feel comfortable with the perception India has of becoming the second most powerful country after China in Asia. At the same time, India would like to play a leading role in the region, rather than simply appearing as a counterweight to China.

Finally, the implications of the Indo-US strategic rapprochement for China might be twofold. If on the one hand China might appear very concerned about such a rapprochement, on the other hand this might

become a reason for enhancing the Indo-Chinese rapprochement as well. In China, indeed, the opinion that-in the light of the improvement of Indo-US relationship-it might become even more dangerous for China to keep a hostile approach towards India might fast and easily consolidate. This attitude and this opinion might push India and China towards becoming partners rather than rivals.

In conclusion, indeed, it can be affirmed that most analysts at the moment seem inclined to believe more in complementarities rather than in competition. As Sanjoy Majumder pointed out, despite all reasons for concern, distrust and dispute India and China have (Kashmir, Pakistan, US, Tibet, influence in Myanmar and Nepal), "many in India believe that it is possible and in fact important to do business with China". Same time Chinese President Hu Jintao during his visit stressed several times its commitment in making the positive development of bilateral relations in recent years an irreversible trend.

**Reference:-**

1. Gilpin, Robert, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1981.
2. Keohane, Robert, After Hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984.
3. A agreement of May 1951 accepted by the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, formally guaranteed that nothing would be changed in Tibetans political, cultural and religious institutions, China failed to abide by the agreement and it considered the annexation of Tibet the final stage in its unification. Graver, John, Protracted Contest. Sino-Indian rivalry in the twentieth century, University of Washington Press, Washington, 2001, pp. 32-78.
4. Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh and Jing-dong Yuan, China and India. Cooperation or conflict?, Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., Boulder, 2003, pp. 9-21.
5. Graver, John, Protracted Contest. Sino-Indian rivalry in the twentieth century, University of Washington Press, Washington, 2001, pp. 32-78, and Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh and Jing-dong Yuan, India and China. Cooperation or conflict?, Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., Boulder, 2003, pp. 9-21.
6. The previous visit had been the one of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in October 1954.
7. Lei Guang, "From National Identity to National Security: China's Changing Responses toward India in 1962 and 1998", The Pacific Review, (Vol.17, No.3, 2004), pp. 399-422 and Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh and Jing-dong Yuan, India and China. Cooperation or conflict?, Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., Boulder, 2003, pp. 9-21.
8. During Wen Jabao's visit in India, an official map clearly showing Sikkim as part of the Republic of India was issued.
9. This visit was in a series of four official visits that brought Chinese President Hu Jintao in Vietnam, Laos, India and Pakistan.
10. Singh, Brartendu Kumar, "Sino-Indian Relations, Recent Developments", IPCS Special Report, (No. 18, May 2006), Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.
11. "China seeks improved India ties", BBC News, 21 November 2006.
12. As regards energy resources, both countries are increasing their

presence in Africa, where China is already a step forward.

13.Somini Sengupta, "Competition between India and China goes beyond borders", The New York Times, 21 November 2006.

#### Bibliography:

- 1.Sanjay Majumder, "India-China ties at a crossroad", BBC News, 21 November 2006.
- 2.Frankel, Francine and Harry Harding, The India-China relationship. What the United States need to know, Columbia University Press, New York, 2004.
- 3.Grare, Frédéric and Amitabh Matoo, India and Asean. The politics of India's look East policy, Manohar Publishers & Distributors, New Delhi, 2001.
- 4."China seeks improved India ties", BBC News, 21 November 2006.
- 5.Graver, John, Protracted Contest. Sino-Indian rivalry in the twentieth century, University of Washington Press, Washington, 2001.
- 6.Somini Sengupta, "Competition between India and China goes beyond borders", The New York Times, 21 November 2006.
- 7.Keohane, Robert, After Hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984.
- 8.Kindleberger, Charles, The World in Depression, 1929-39, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1975.
- 9.Lei Guang, "From National Identity to National Security: China's Changing Responses toward India in 1962 and 1998", The Pacific Review, (Vol.17, No.3 2004), pp. 399-422.
- 10.Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh and Jing-dong Yuan, India and China. Cooperation or conflict?, Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., Boulder, 2003.
- 11.Singh, Brartendu Kumar, "Sino-Indian Relations, Recent Developments", IPCS Special Report, (No.18, May 2006), Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.
- 12."China, India sign wide-ranging joint declaration", Xinhua Economic News Service, 22 November 2006.
- 13."China, India to build strategic partnership", People's Daily Online, 12 April 2005.
- 14."China lauds India-Pakistan peace", BBC News, 22 November 2006.
- 15.John Lancaster, "India, China Hoping to 'Reshape the World Order' Together", Washington Post Foreign Service, 12 April 2005.
- 16.Joint Declaration by the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China, 21 November 2006. <http://www.mea.gov.in/declarestatement/2006/11/21jd01.htm>.